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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on the implications suggested by several recent studies in compara- 
tive public policy, this article examines the impact of the structure of intergovern- 
mental relations on the patterns of distribution of educational funds. The funda- 
mental hypothesis underlying this analysis is that differences in this structure, and 
in particular the distinction between federal and unitary systems of government, are 
systematically related to differences in distribution across and within nations. The 
variations in total educational allocations among eighteen nations in Europe and 
North America are considered in order t o  discover whether the aggregate funding of 
education, relative to a nation’s wealth, is related t o  the structure of intergovern- 
mental relations. Then, in  a more intensive analysis, the intranational patterns of 
distribution are compared in four federal and four unitary systems. This analysis 
suggests that there is a significant difference between the two types of system in the 
degree t o  which educational policy outputs equalize the territorial disparities in 
wealth and effect a redistribution of funds within the nation. 
Making policy involves the distribution of social resources among 
arenas of public concern. Thus, policies are frequently evaluated in 
terms of their distributional effects - what policy arenas and which 
policy advocates receive a relative advantage in the allocation of out- 
puts? That is, who gains at whose expense in the policy process? 
It is not by chance that students of public authority who are con- 
cerned with patterns of distribution very often study education policy. 
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Education policy lies at the crossroads of the economy and the polity. 
The education policy process involves interaction of class, religion, 
ethnic and linguistic conflicts. No other arena of social policy more 
accurately reflects patterns of social distribution which have cumulated 
through past resolution of these conflicts in favor of particular groups. 
And because educational outcomes structure the allocation of values 
within a society not only for the immediate period but also for future 
generations, no other arena of policy has been more politicized by 
those advocating or opposing fundamental social reform. Rokkan, for 
example, has ably demonstrated that the conflicts between center and 
periphery which emerged at critical junctures in the process of nation- 
building in Europe were politicized in jurisdictional disputes over the 
control of education. 
Wherever support for education has become a politically contested 
issue there has been continuing experimentation and dispute over the 
format of public responsibility. In particular, those who perceive dis- 
tributional inequities in educational systems often advocate centraliza- 
tion of financial responsibility. Thus, for example, much of the recent 
discussion about educational finance in the United States has advocated 
an assumption of greater financial responsibility by the American states 
and/or the federal g~ve rnmen t .~  Centralization, it is argued, may 
reduce the extent to which education spending mirrors territorial dis- 
parities in social resources. On the other hand, advocates of decen- 
tralization may argue that centralization does not result in any 
measurable improvement of disparities and may only increase the 
bureaucratic overload of a society and its policy-making apparatus. 
Although advocacy of greater or lesser centralization usually rests upon 
values placed on fundamental aspects of cultural pluralism, positions 
are often taken or rationalized in terms of assumed implications for 
substantive policy. The growing attraction of decentralization and the 
related concept of regional autonomy is amply demonstrated by the 
serious proposals for, and, occasionally, implementation of funda- 
mental reforms in such formally unitary systems as Britain, Belgium, 
France, Italy, and S ~ e d e n . ~  To the extent that this attraction with 
decentralization takes on institutional reality, it is plausible that the 
distributional consequences in the field of education - one of the 
largest arenas of domestic policy - will change. 
In the face of contemporary patterns of flux in intergovernmental 
relations within advanced industrial nations, an inquiry into the dis- 
tributional consequences of these relations has more than heuristic 
value. In particular, it is useful to assess patterns of resource allocation 
to education within and across a set of nations which display wide 
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variations in their degree of centralization. In so doing, we shall attempt 
to  provide answers for the following questions: Is the structure of 
intergovernmental relations systematically associated with the alloca- 
tion of resources across and within nations? Do nations which are more 
centralized spend more, both in absolute terms and relative to their 
resource base, than decentralized nations? And, more importantly, do 
nations which are more centralized distribute funds for education more 
evenly than decentralized systems’? Does centralization affect policies 
of equalization of within-nation disparities in resources? Do unitary 
systems, in fact, go so far as to carry out a system-wide redistribu.tion 
of resources from the wealthy to  the poor - from, to use Rokkan’s 
terms, the center to  the peripheries? 
Previous research base 
In recent years, comparative research has begun to suggest the prob- 
able significance for public policy of the structure of intergovernmental 
relations of a nation. This contrasts with the pattern of explanation 
which emerged from the first comparative and empirical studies of 
public policy variations in the American  state^.^ In these early studies, 
the importance of a wide set of political variables for explaining public 
policy was questioned. Instead, it was sometimes suggested, differences 
in policy were more closely associated with variations in the socio- 
economic resource base and, in particular, with levels of wealth of the 
states than with any measurable aspects of their governmental or politi- 
cal structures. 
As the technology and domain of inquiry expanded, however, initial 
conclusions about the importance of socioeconomic variables, relative 
to political variables were refined, elaborated, and in some cases, 
rejected. For example, it has been found that policy outputs across 
several arenas tended to cluster together, and some of these clusters - 
in particular, one composed of welfare and education policy outputs - 
are as closely associated with political attributes as they are with mea- 
sures of socioeconomic structure. 
The suggestion that certain elements of the states’ political structure 
are as important as those of the socioeconomic environment has been 
supported by several studies. Walker, for example, found that the 
propensity of American states to  adopt new programs in a variety of 
fields was in part dependent on the degree of equity in the apportion- 
ment of repre~entation.~ Cowart found that indicators of the electoral 
process were more closely associated with expenditures in a new pro- 
gram area - the Anti-Poverty Program - than were various indicators 
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of socioeconomic environment. * Similarly, Boaden found, in an analy- 
sis of English county boroughs, that partisan control of municipal 
councils was significantly related to  education policy outputs. 
Only with recent development of comparative subnational research 
has the term “political variables” come to include a specification of the 
structure of intergovernmental relations. Yet, in spite of the under- 
developed nature of theory in this field, various studies have suggested 
that the pattern of intergovernmental relations may be of critical im- 
portance for policy, since it establishes the framework within which all 
other variables - political and socioeconomic - operate. This con- 
clusion emerges from three different analytical settings: comparative 
urban research, single-country subnational studies, and cross-national 
research. 
Several comparative urban studies have concluded that one must 
examine the relation of localities to higher levels of government in 
order to  understand patterns of urban policy. Kesselman, for example, 
sketches a system of interaction by which urban policy makers are 
constrained by officials at other levels of government. More important- 
ly for our purposes here, this system of interaction is defined to a large 
extent by the manner in which financial responsibility is allocated 
among levels of government. Thus the variations across nations in, for 
example, the degree of centralization, may explain why urban policies 
vary comparatively.ll This is one of the conclusions which emerges 
from Anton and Williams’ comparative study of housing policy in 
Stockholm and London. They suggest that differences in residential 
class segregation in the two cities may be a function of Stockholm’s 
greater centralization in housing policy-making. 
This theme has been stated most forcefully by Jacob, Teune and 
their colleagues in their study of community activism in America, India, 
Yugoslavia, and Poland. The authors concluded that the explanation 
of community activism was system specific rather than universal, 
largely because structures of national/local responsibility dominated the 
character of the explanatory variables. That is, national policies, such as 
the allocation of most funding responsibility for education to the 
American localities or the emphasis placed on the development of the 
new western territories by the Polish government, determined the rela- 
tionships within each nation among the local-level sociopolitical and 
policy variables. 
The general conclusion to  be drawn from these comparative urban 
studies is that policy outputs at one level of government are critically 
influenced by the structure of relations among several levels of govern- 
ment. Variation in urban policy outputs across several nations is a result 
228 
of the differences among them in the structure of intergovernmental 
relations. 
Several studies in single nations have drawn conclusions similar to 
those emerging from comparative urban research. A recent study by 
Simeon of federal-provincial relations in Canada addresses the question : 
“What are the consequences of federal structures and institutions for 
the processes of policy-making?” Simeon concludes his analysis of 
Canada’s peculiar form of executive federalism, to use Smiley’s term, 
with the suggestion that this form of intergovernmental relations pro- 
duces patterns of policy that differ from those which would occur in 
either a more centralized system or a federal system with little coor- 
dination across levels of government. ’ 
The significance of intergovernmental relations has emerged from 
another single-nation study of policy-making in a federal system. ’ * We 
have analyzed patterns of change over time in education policy in the 
American states and have found that the strongest determinant of pro- 
gressive policy change was a measure of the increase in the share of 
financial responsibility carried by the states rather than the localities. 
The fact that the analysis was longitudinal, treating degree of change as 
the dependent variable, considerably strengthens the validity of the 
causal inferences relating intergovernmental relations and public policy. 
A third type of study - that conducted with nations as units ~ has 
also affirmed the significance of intergovernmental relations and, in 
particular, the impact of centralization on educational policy. Pryor has 
considered the extent to  which centralization, viewed as a systemic 
attribute setting the background for the policy process, affects various 
public consumption expenditures. He found that the proportion of 
national wealth devoted to education was greater in a set of seven 
centralized systems, and that centralization was in fact the only signifi- 
cant determinant of variations across the nations in the proportion. 
On the other hand, Pryor found that total allocations to education did 
not seem to vary between the centralized and non-centralized systems. 
While shortcomings in Pry or’s analysis make these conclusions specula- 
tive at best,20 the mode of research is innovative and is particularly 
useful for assessing the impact of intergovernmental relations. As we 
shall suggest, however, it is necessary to  combine Pryor’s type of analy- 
sis between dichotomized sets of nations with the approach of those 




The existing research base, summarized in the preceding section, 
provides a provocative point of departure for our research. The core 
message is that the patterns of allocation of public resources, for ex- 
ample, funds for education, may be critically affected by the structure 
of relations among levels of government. More particularly, the distribu- 
tional consequences of education policy may systematically differ 
across sets of nations as a function of variance in intergovernmental 
structures. The impact of these structures on public policy may be 
neither nation-specific nor comparable across all nations. Instead, dis- 
tributions of resources to education may be comparable within a set of 
systems, e.g., decentralized systems, and yet markedly different from 
those in systems with a different structure of intergovernmental rela- 
tions. Whereas Jacob, Teune and their colleagues were forced by their 
findings to abjure cross-national generalizations, it may be possible, by 
maximizing variance on one promising facet of several systems, to move 
a step beyond system-specific conclusions. 
The surest means of assessing the impact of different structures of 
intergovernmental relations is by maximizing the variance on this sys- 
tematic property across the set of nations under investigation. We do 
this by contrasting the patterns of resource distribution in certain cen- 
tralized systems with those found in a particular subset of decentralized 
systems - federal nations. The choice of constitutionally defined 
federal systems highlights a key distinction - that the important dif- 
ference in intergovernmental relations is not simply that between de 
facto centralized and decentralized but that between unitary and 
federal systems of government. Two federal (or unitary) systems may 
manifest different degrees of allocation of financial responsibility to the 
central government and yet the two may not differ in any measurable 
way in the structure of intergovernmental relations (e.g., Austria and 
Switzerland, as seen in Table I).  On the other hand two systems, one of 
which is unitary and the other federal, may have very different struc- 
tures of intergovernmental relations in spite of comparable levels of 
fiscal centralization (e.g., Norway and Austria).2 
Federalism differs from unitary systems in the reservation of certain 
specified or implied public policy responsibilities to authorities within 
intermediary subnational governments. The decentralization of 
policy- making characteristics of federal systems recognizes internal 
diversity in the sociopolitical composition of territorial jurisdictions 
and the right of these jurisdictions to use their resources in different 
ways. 24 The nature of federal systems thus insures considerable varia- 
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TABLE I 
Percent of Total Educational Expenses, 1965, from Central Government in Eighteen Nations* 
Nation % Central Nation % Central 
Government Government 




































* Source: See Note 32. 
tion in policy performance among subnational units. In fact, the op- 
portunity for such variation is part of the inherent constitutional logic 
of this system of g o v e r n ~ n e n t . ~ ~  
Public education in federal systems has, perhaps more than any other 
policy, been the preserve of subnational governments (which have 
frequently chosen to pass much of the financial responsibility on to 
municipalities). In contrast to  the implied, and occasionally explicit, 
limits in federations on the central government’s educational role, the 
growth of public pdicy authority of the national government in unitary 
systems has more often than not been fought out precisely in the arena 
of education. Thus while subnational and local dominance characterizes 
education policy in federal systems, national government dominance 
generally characterizes unitary nations’ education policy. As may be 
seen in Table I, the constitutionally federal systems - Austria, Canada, 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United States - are generally char- 
acterized by a much lower central fiscal role than the unitary systems. 
There are notable exceptions, however, and we shall consider these later 
in our analysis. 
Since differences in the structure of intergovernmental relations be- 
tween federal and unitary systems seem to be clear in the field of 
education policy, we hypothesize that the distributional consequences 
for public policy are markedly different in these two types of systems. 
This is the fundamental hypothesis underlying our analysis. We shall 
seek confirmation by testing a series of derivative hypotheses about the 
nature of the difference between education policy outputs in federal 
23 1 
and non-federal systems. In so doing we shall be able to provide at least 
a partial answer to the following question: What difference for public 
policy does federalism make? 
One of the most important aspects of education policy, and one 
which might vary in federal and non-federal systems, involves the ag- 
gregate size of funds allocated to  this policy area, relative to the re- 
source base of the nation. There is a widespread view that more of a 
nation’s wealth is allocated to education in centralized than in decen- 
tralized systems. Pryor suggests several reasons why this should be so. 
In centralized systems. he argues, there is greater hierarchic control and 
unity of budgetary organs, greater comparability of budgets and thus 
greater policy emulation across nations, thereby heightening the 
capacity to  concentrate resources in such fundamental policy areas as 
education.26 In discussing the relation of increasing affluence and cen- 
tralization Peacock and Wiseman infer that greater centralization will 
result in greater allocations of funds for the following reasons: cen- 
tralization is both a product and cause of the development of uniform 
standards of policy: it enables government to overcome problems which 
transcend or are external to local governments; and it allows a greater 
reliance on more efficient (i.e., wealth-elastic) revenue systems. In 
addition, Heidenheimer has suggested that the very nature of decision- 
making in a federal system - the myriad of decision makers and policy- 
making institutions - contributes to the fragmentation of effort by 
national advocacy groups and the entrenchment at the subnational level 
of forces which resist reform.28 In contrast, centralization tends to  
produce an integration of academic and bureaucratic experts, advocacy 
groups, and national policy makers. Finally, one might assume that a 
relatively large central government role reflects a broad national con- 
sensus in support of the policy - a carry-over from the nineteenth 
century struggle for national integration which prompted the assertion 
of central government responsibility for education in the first place. 
Thus we hypothesize that: 
HI : The greater the central government’s financial responsibility for 
education the greater the funds expended on education in the 
total system, relative to the resource base of the system. 
As noted earlier and illustrated in Table I, however, fiscal decen- 
tralization and constitutional federalism are not necessarily identical. 
The relative decentralization of England and Norway, compared to  the 
other constitutionally unitary systems, and the centralization of the 
Austrian federation are the most notable deviators. One may argue that, 
irrespective of the level of government doing the spending, the formal 
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autonomy of multiple decision points implicit in federalism will have an 
overall conservative effect upon aggregate educational spending. There- 
fore, it is reasonable to  test a sub-hypothesis of the first proposition, 
iiamely : 
H, a : Federal systems allocate less to education, relative to  their re- 
Although the question of the impact of federal and unitary struc- 
tures of government on the level of education spending of whole 
nations is interesting, this is only one aspect of the distribution ques- 
tion. A more important aspect, and one which lies at the heart of the 
problem of distributional inequities, involves the patterns of allocation 
within nations. There are, of course, many standards by which the 
equity of distribution might be measured. One of the most meaningful, 
although certainly not the only standard,29 is the pattern of variation 
in the allocation of funds for education among the territorial juris- 
dictions within each nation. Since the distinction between federal and 
unitary systems involves the question of territorial jurisdictions, it is 
plausible that within-nation variation in outputs may be strongly re- 
lated to  differences in the structure of intergovernmental relations. 
Federalism insures considerable variation in policy performance 
among the subnational units. Not only are there multiple layers of 
authority and numerous decision points, but decision makers at the 
subnational level have substantial autonomy. The effect of multiple 
levels and units of decision-making, each characterized by a degree of 
autonomy, is likely to be the perpetuation of policy diversity in federal 
systems. The overall effect would be wide territorial variation in the 
total funds allocated to education. In contrast, the presence of a strong 
central role in funding education reduces the multiplicity of decision 
points. Centralization should encourage, in contrast to the situation in 
federal systems, uniformity and equalization of outputs across the na- 
tion. Thus we hypothesize that: 
H2 :  Unitary systems manifest less relative variation than do federal 
systems in educational expenditures across the nation’s sub- 
national jurisdictions. 
The structure of intergovernmental relations may affect not only the 
magnitude of intranational variation in spending, but also the extent to 
which this variation is socioeconomically constrained. Federalism may 
result in a pattern of allocation which is, in terms of the entire system, 
constrained by variation in resource bases across the subnational deci- 
sion units. It is common for subnational (e.g., state, province, canton) 
source base, than do unitary systems. 
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decision-makers in a federal system to implement partial equalization 
programs t o  compensate for resource disparities of municipalities or 
local subdivisions within their jurisdiction. Subnational governments 
usually attempt to reduce variations across localities in total allocations 
to  education. Furthermore, federal governments sometimes attempt to  
reduce variations across the subnational units. However, national 
government in most federal systems is responsible for only a small 
portion of all funds allocated, their equalization programs are partial at 
best, and much of their funding is allocated on a strict per capita basis 
quite irrespective of within-nation disparities in resource bases. Thus 
public policy outputs may, with only slight adjustments, mirror existing 
disparities within a nation in, for example, levels of wealth. In contrast, 
nations with major funding from central governments, granting little 
autonomy to intermediate levels, may produce policy outputs which 
are less constrained by intranational resource variations. That is, internal 
variations in policy outputs which do occur across territorial units of 
unitary systems may be less closely associated with internal variations 
in socioeconomic structure and, in particular, levels of wealth, than is 
the case in federal systems. As a result, the policy process in non-federal 
systems may effect a more territorially equitable distribution of alloca- 
tions, thereby equalizing intranational disparities in social resource 
base. Accordingly we hypothesize that: 
H, : Variations in educational expenditure within non-federal sys- 
tems are less closely associated with subnational disparities in 
socioeconomic resource base than in federal systems. 
These hypotheses preface our consideration of the impact of federal- 
ism or non-federalism on the distribution of educational funds within 
nations. As was suggested earlier, one important facet of the distribu- 
tion pattern is whether certain areas benefit at the expense of other 
areas in the allocation of education funds. If the structure of inter- 
governmental relations, and more precisely the distinction between 
federal and unitary systems, is related systematically to public policy, 
then surely the patterns of relative advantage should differ in the two 
systems. We need to  see to  what degree federalism results in an advan- 
tage, in terms of cumulative spending by all levels of government, for 
the richer areas of a nation. Is total spending higher in industrial than in 
agrarian areas? To what degree is education spending higher in the more 
commercialized, tertiary-dominated urban centers of a nation? If either 
type of governmental system results in a relative advantage to  the 
urban, industrial and/or wealthy commercial centers then the impact of 
policy is t o  mirror social disparities and t o  perpetuate the inequalities 
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of treatment in a system. That is, less would be allocated for each 
student’s education in the non-industrial and non-commercial peri- 
pheries than would be in their opposites, thereby discriminating ac- 
cording to residential location. On the other hand, systems in which 
total educational allocations are distributed in relatively equal amounts 
among the socioeconomically disadvantaged and the wealthier areas 
tend, by this equalization, to compensate for territorially based social 
disparities. 
Finally, the impact of public policy may be not only to equalize 
distributions but to  effect a system-wide redistribution of social re- 
sources. That is, education allocations in one or both types of systems 
may give a relative advantage to the most socioeconomically deprived 
areas of a nation. 
If it is true, as the previous hypotheses suggest, that federalism re- 
sults in a system of expenditures which is to a considerable extent 
constrained by social resource disparities across the subnational units, 
then we expect policy outputs to favor the most advantaged areas in 
federal systems. Both the industrial and the commercial centers, and in 
particular the wealthiest areas, will receive relatively larger allocations. 
In contrast, in unitary systems, where outputs are hypothesized to  be 
less constrained by areal disparities in social resources, the impact of 
policy would be to  equalize distributions, and possibly to  redistribute 
resources from the wealthiest areas to the poorer, non-industrial, non- 
commercial and rural areas. Thus we hypothesize that: 
H,: Unitary systems tend to compensate for disparities in socio- 
economic resource base by effecting redistribution of resources 
to  the non-industrial, non-commercial, and poorest areas. In 
contrast, allocations in federal systems are non-equalizing and 
tend to  mirror these disparities. 
Findings 
FEDERALISM AND EDUCATION ALLOCATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 
The first major hypothesis suggests that nations in which financial 
responsibility for education is relatively centralized will allocate more 
of available social resources to education than will decentralized sys- 
tems. In order to  test this proposition, nation-level data for the eighteen 
countries of western Europe and North America have been analyzed. 
Most of these nations are, by world standards, relatively wealthy and 
industrialized. By limiting our analysis to  this subset and by treating the 
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level of expenditures relative to the level of national income as the 
dependent variable, we have attempted to control for the overwhelming 
relation between levels of expenditure and levels of wealth which has 
been reported by most cross-national s t ~ d i e s . ~  
In Table 11, the correlations are presented for these eighteen nations 
among attributes of their systems of education finance and the propor- 
tion of national income devoted to education. H, is clearly rejected. 
Nations with a relatively large central government role in education 
funding devote less of their national wealth than do those nations in 
which subnational and local governments have predominant financial 
responsibility. The relation between central government role and the 
dependent variable is certainly not overwhelming. Yet the fact that the 
relationship between these two variables is slight at best, and in fact in 
the contrary direction (ix., a negative sign), clearly suggests that the 
type of financing system may, in terms of national allocations, have no 
significant policy impact. On the contrary, the most significant at- 
tribute of the funding system is the role of localities. This role, it 
should be noted, is obviously large in federal systems. However, certain 
unitary systems such as those of Britain and Scandinavia assign as much 
responsibility to  the localities as do federal systems. 
In order to  test the subordinate hypothesis (HI a )  which asserts that 
constitutionally federal systems in particular tend to allocate less of 
their national resources to education than unitary systems (which is 
not, we have noted, the same as testing the impact of mere fiscal 
centralization), we created an index of policy effort relative to  level of 
centralization. By regressing the proportion of national wealth devoted 
to education upon the proportion of funds deriving from the central 
government, the effect of fiscal centralization is held constant. If the 
hypothesis is true, the residuals from this regression - which, when 
TABLE I1 
Correlation of Educational Spending as Percent of National Income with Scope of Levels of 
Government, 1965 
Percent of all education funds from: % National income 
Spent on Education 
1965 
Central government -.17 




standardized, compose the index - should cluster the federal nations 
together. In particular, the residuals for the federal systems should form 
a distinct group at the negative pole of the-index. This would confirm 
the suggestion that these systems are, in comparison with unitary sys- 
tems of government, relative under-achievers in terms of total distribu- 
tions of national wealth to  education. 
Table I11 presents the effort/centralization index. There is some con- 
firmation of the hypothesis, although it is not primarily the federal 
systems but rather those of the Iberian peninsula which are the major 
under-achievers. The European federal systems - Germany, Switzer- 
land, and Austria - do cluster together and allocate considerably less to 
education than do most of the nations of northern Europe. On the 
other hand, federal systems do not all behave alike. In particular, those 
of North America differ from those of Europe in their allocations to 
education. In fact, if one were to exclude Spain and Portugal, Canada 
and Germany - two decidedly “federal” systems - compose the two 
poles of the index. 
TABLE 111 
Index of Education Effort Relative to Degree of Centralization of Education Finance* 











































‘i; Effort is measured by taking percent of national income allocated to education. Index is 
obtained by regressing Effort on percent of education revenues deriving from central govern- 
ment. ** Constitutionally federal systems. 
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The difference between Canada and Germany suggests that both, but 
Canada in particular, may be deviant cases. Why is it that Canada out- 
performs not only other federal systems but all the unitary systems of 
Europe - in marked contrast t o  Germany’s performance? The data in 
Table IV suggest several explanations for the contrast between Canada 
and Germany. Education consumes twice as large a portion of total 
governmental budgets in Canada. It would appear that a major reason 
involves the much greater development of higher education in Canada. 
Any explanation must be somewhat speculative, but it seems that some 
of the differences in policy may flow from Canada’s relatively greater 
flexibility in financing education. 
The two systems differ markedly in the extent to which non-central, 
and in particular provincial and Lander, governments changed their 
scope of financial responsibility in a five year period in the mid-1960s. 
In Canada the provinces have moved into the field of education as part 
of a broader assertion of provincial re~ponsibil i ty.~ In Germany, how- 
ever, the scope of financial authority has remained inflexible. Municipa- 
lities continued in the middle 1960s to have no share in funding higher 
education while that of the Ldnder dropped. The greater financial 
flexibility of Canadian federalism, as manifested by its ability to  
respond to  increased demand for higher education in the 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  may be 
a product of the greater institutionalization of intergovernmental 
coordination. In contrast to  Germany, where a Bund-Lander Commis- 
sion for Education Planning came into effect only in 1970, Canada has 
had throughout the last decade a form of intergovernmental coordina- 
tion in the Federal-Provincial C ~ n f e r e n c e . ~  Through this latter body, a 
system of revenue sharing has been created, based largely on wealth- 
elastic categories such as personal and corporate income. Flexibility, in 
the sense of adjusting the funding shares of the various levels of govern- 
ment, is assured by the quinquennial renegotiations provided by the 
Fiscal Agreements Act. Of major importance, from the view of the large 
allocation of education funds relative to national income, is that these 
negotiated arrangements have contained sophisticated systems of 
equalization grants from the federal government to  the provinces, par- 
ticularly t o  Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces. The institutionalization 
in Canada of a system of intergovernmental coordination which 
provided revenue sharing to aid poorer Provinces and periodic adjust- 
ment of funding responsibilities stands in marked contrast to  the situa- 
tion in Germany. In the latter, systems of intergovernmental equaliza- 




A Comparison of Attributes of the German and Canadian Education Systems* 
Canada Germany 
Percent of goverment expenditures for public education, 1965 23.6 10.9 
Percent of the population age 20-24 in higher education 30.1 11.3 
Change 1963-1968 in non-central government percentage 
Change 1963-1968 in province/land percentage in funding 
in funding higher education + 7.6 - 3.5 
higher education +19.8 - 3.5 
* Data from OECD, Reviews of National Policies for Education: Germany (Paris: OECD, 1972), 
p. 132; and Education Statistics: A Review from 1960-61 to 1970-71 (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, 1973), pp. 178,493-495, 500,502. 
FEDERALISM AND EDUCATION ALLOCATIONS WITHIN NATIONS 
Questions of the magnitude of aggregate national education funding 
are interesting. However, the thrust of debate over the impact of stmc- 
tures of intergovernmental relations (and in particular the differences 
between federal and unitary systems) is aimed at patterns of distribu- 
tion within nations. Our second hypothesis suggested that there is less 
variation in education expenditures across the territorial units of a 
unitary system than among those of a federal system. In order to test 
this and subsequent hypotheses, patterns of within-nation variation 
have been examined in four federal systems (Canada, Germany, Swit- 
zerland, and the United States) and compared with those in four 
unitary systems (England, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). 
Austria was excluded from the analysis on the grounds that the large 
central sharc (59 percent) and lack of legislative and policy-making 
autonomy in the field of education make it an atypical federal system, 
at least in this policy area.35 The choice of the four non-federal sys- 
tems was somewhat more complex.36 Table V presents various data on 
the financial aspects of education in the four non-federal and four 
federal systems considered here. 
If our second hypothesis is valid, the non-federal systems should have 
considerably lower degrees of intranational variation in educational ex- 
penditures per pupil than the federal systems. In order to test this, 
coefficients of relative variation ([standard deviation/mean] X 100) 
have been computed for total education spending per pupil in the sub- 
national units of the eight nations.37 The results, in Table VI, suggest 
239 
TABLE V 
Percent of Total Education Expenditures, By Source, 1965" 
Central Sub- Local & % National 
Education 
1965 
national Private Income, 
~ _ _ _  
Non -Federal 
England 5 1  0 43 6.4 
Netherlands 8 1  0 19 1.6 
Norway 50 2 48 6.5 
Sweden 6 1  2 3 1  1.3 
Federal 
Canada 10 46 4 4  8.5 
Germany 3 68 29 4.3 
Switzerland 9 41 4 4  5 .O 
United States 12 29 59 6.5 
* Source: See Note 32. 
that, although there are some exceptions to  the rule, federal systems 
display considerable intranational variation in total funds allocated to  
education. Conversely, unitary systems and, perhaps surprisingly, par- 
ticularly that form in existence outside Scandinavia, seem to moderate 
their inter-regional disparities. Thus the second hypothesis is confirmed. 
TABLE VI 



















x 100 * Standard deviation 
mean 
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In order to  test the third and fourth hypotheses, relating to the 
structure of intergovernmental relations and the degree and patterns of 
socioeconomic constraint of education policy, it is necessary to develop 
measures of within-nation variations in resource base. These measures 
must be parsimonious and cross-nationally comparable and yet also 
reflect unique constellations of social differentiation likely to con- 
stitute political cleavages in each system. That is, they must be equiva- 
lent while still accommodating unique system-specific features asso- 
ciated with racial, religious, ethnic, and linguistic variations in the na- 
tions. 
In order to develop measures which are both cross-nationally equiva- 
lent and yet system-sensitive, a multidimensional perspective of social 
structure has been utilized. By means of factor analysis of a set of 
socioeconomic and cultural attributes of subnational units in several 
nations, Hofferbert, et. al. have derived two independent indices of 
social structural ~ a r i a t i o n . ~  One, labeled industrialization, traced the 
differences among the units in the extent of secondary sector employ- 
ment and production, and, conversely, the differences in the size and 
degree of reliance on primary sector activity. The second dimension, 
presently labeled integration, is more complex insofar as it is indepen- 
dent of the measure of primary-secondary differentiation. This second 
dimension does nevertheless trace an important pattern of variation, 
although it is one generally ignored by many development theorists. It 
traces the difference across subnational units in the attributes of the 
most “modern” sectors of society - in this day and age, measures 
which are often associated with post-industrial society: tertiary sector 
dominance, commercialization (including commercialized agriculture), 
higher education, employment in the professions, media diffusion, and 
personal a f f l ~ e n c e . ~  What makes the integration dimension particu- 
larly interesting, however, is the juxtaposition of the variation across a 
nation in these modern and post-industrial attributes upon a variation 
based on the ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages of a society. It is 
precisely those areas of least tertiary sector development, and least 
commercialization and affluence, which have often contained relatively 
large groups of individuals who by their language, religion or their 
ethnicity constitute national minorities. And as a result it has been 
these areas which have most often been the site of confrontations 
against secularization and commercialization, and which have manifest- 
ed regional defenses against what Rokkan has termed the “central 
na tion-b uilding culture .”4 
The essential utility of the two-dimensional indexing of social struc- 
ture is the ability to move to a more sophisticated conception of 
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“modernity” or “development” than is customary in much comparative 
research. The factory/farm distinction can thus be viewed separately 
from the conceptually richer and more distinct index of post-industrial/ 
traditional or center/periphery dimension which we have here and else- 
where labeled “integration.” Integration - in the sense of a national 
network of interaction between remote actors and relative strangers - 
is not necessarily or historically dependent upon industrialization. The 
advantage of the factor analytic technique (as revealed in Appendix I) is 
its ability to approximate cross-national comparability despite variations 
in measurement accuracy of specific indicators. 
Appendix I presents the factor structures for the dimensions of in- 
dustrialization and integration4 By comparing the composition of 
these dimensions one can determine the extent to which they represent 
cross-nationally equivalent patterns of within-nation variation. The 
most highly loaded variables on the industrialization dimension are ones 
which trace the occupational and sectoral attributes associated with 
manufacturing or industry, urban work force, size of firm, etc. Wealth 
tends to be related to  this dimension, but only moderately so. The 
non-industrial areas tend, not surprisingly, to be those with the most 
predominant primary sectors (although not necessarily agrarian, as the 
Norwegian case suggests). 
It is more difficult to assess the cross-national comparability of the 
integration dimension, precisely because it does contain the complex 
juxtaposition of “traditional” and “modern” aspects of society. How- 
ever, one notes certain features common to all. The highest loaded vari- 
ables are associated with affluence commercialization either in the 
sense of occupation, as in the case of the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, or in the sense of exchange, as is the case in 
the United States (retail and farm sales) and Canada (farm sales); pro- 
fessionalization, as is the case with the loading of doctors per thousand 
in several nations; and, where available, education, particularly higher 
education. Recalling Bell’s emphasis on the importance of the role of 
services and the production of knowledge in post-industrial society14 
it seems clear that this dimension traces, within these nations, a 
phenomenon which has heretofore been treated solely in terms of 
whole nations. 
We continue to  label the dimension “integration,” however, in recog- 
nition of the particular salience of those system-specific cleavages which 
distinguish areas in terms of those attributes discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. The culture features of integration are ethnicity in Canada 
and the United States, language in Switzerland, Canada and Norway, 
and religion in Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and 
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the Netherlands. It should be noted that the salient cleavage in terms of 
integration in the Netherlands is that of no religion versus Catholicism 
and orthodox Calvinism rather than Protestantism versus Catholi- 
c i ~ m . ~ ~  One should also note that, of the attributes of non-integrated 
areas, religion seems to  be the most cross-nationally prevalent (although 
the other bases of differentiation may be more liable to produce in- 
ternal conflict) and that, not surprisingly, federal systems (and in par- 
ticular Canada) tend to contain a complex multiplicity of these features 
of cultural p~ural ism.~ 
The factor scores obtained for each of the subnational units on these 
dimensions seem intuitively plausible. For example, industrialization 
for Norway contrasts the fylker of Ostfold, Oslo, Buskerud, Vestfold 
and Telemark with the fishing-dominant areas in the north. Integration 
contrasts Oslo and Bergen with the fylker of Oppland, Hordaland, Sggn 
og Fjordane, and Nord Tr4ndelag. Those for Switzerland contrast, on 
industrialization, the cantons of Solothurn and Schaffhausen with 
Valais and Ticino, while integration contrasts Zurich, Geneve, Basel- 
Stadt and Vaud with Uri, Schwyz, Obwald and Appenzell Inner 
Rhoden. Industrialization for England contrasts Staffordshire, Warwick- 
shire and Yorkshire West Riding with Cornwall, Lincoln and 
Shropshire, while integration contrasts London, Surrey, Sussex, Ox- 
fordshire and Berkshire with Durham and Northumberland in the 
north, and the rural west. And the dimensions for the Netherlands 
contrast the heavily industrial (and Catholic) provinces of Noord- 
Brdbant and Limburg with the rural provinces of Zeeland and Friesland. 
Integration contrasts Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, and, to a lesser 
extent, Utrecht with the rest of the ~ o u n t r y . ~ ’  
The factor scores for these two dimensions allow a parsimonious but 
comparable measurement of variations in resource base within each 
nation. Thus by investigating the intranational relationships of the 
scores on these dimensions and total educational expenditures per pupil 
it  is possible to test the third and fourth hypotheses. 
According to the third hypothesis, variations in educational expen- 
ditures in federal systems are much more constrained by variations in 
resource base than are those in non-federal systems. A relatively simple 
way of testing this proposition, once one has appropriate measures, is 
to compare the coefficients of determination (R2)  obtained for each 
nation with the expenditures per pupil predicted by the two social 
structural dimensions. If educational expenditures in non-federal sys- 
tems are territorially non-discriminatory this should be manifested in 
markedly lower coefficients than those found in federal systems. This 
seems to be the message of Table VII, bearing out the third hypothesis. 
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TABLE VII 






















* Percent of the variance explained by industrialization and integration. 
There are, however, some important differences among the non-federal 
systems. In particular, Norway and Sweden display a lower degree of 
constraint than does the Netherlands. However, as will be seen shortly 
this simple measure masks as much as it suggests. 
These differences between federal and non-federal systems in the 
degree of intranational variation and socioeconomic constraint are 
surely important. Nevertheless, the critical question from the perspec- 
tive of the impact of policy on the equity of distribution involves the 
patterns of relative advantage in the two types of systems. The fourth 
hypothesis suggested that distribution in non-federal systems com- 
pensates poorer areas for disparities in resource base, while distributions 
in federal systems tend to mirror, and thus perpetuate, these disparities. 
Hypothesis four can be tested by investigating the relation between the 
total per pupil education expenditures and the two socioeconomic 
dimensions. 
If it is true that non-federal systems compensate for resource dis- 
parities one would expect to find the relationship between expenditures 
and these dimensions to  be moderate. In contrast the relationships, 
especially that involving the integration dimension, should be strong 
and positive in federal systems. Non-federal systems may effect an 
equalization of allocations - reflected in near-zero relationships - or even 
a system-wide redistribution of funds - reflected in negative relationships 
between the dimensions and the dependent variable, indicative of great- 
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est expenditure levels in the least advantaged areas. Regardless of which 
pattern is found in the non-federal systems, it is critical to our funda- 
mental hypothesis regarding the consequentiality of intergovernmental 
relations that the relationships of the dimensions to the spending vari- 
able are comparable for each system of government and that the two 
patterns of distribution advantage are distinctive. 
Table VIII presents the simple correlations between the two dimen- 
sions of industrialization and integration and the spending variable in 
each of the eight nations. These data confirm the fourth hypothesis. 
They provide strong evidence that the patterns of distribution differ 
systematically according to the structure of intergovernmental rela- 
tions. In particular, three of the four federal systems effect a distribu- 
tional advantage for those areas which are industrialized. More im- 
portant, in view of its closer association with wealth, is the very strong 
positive relationship between integration and spending (the range in the 
coefficients is from 0.73 to 0.87). Quite clearly, federal systems in their 
distributions in this policy area tend to mirror and thus perpetuate the 
wealth-related disparities of the nation. In spite of the variability in 
proportion of wealth devoted to education found in Table 11, all four 
nations reflect a nearly identical pattern of relationship in this, the 
fiscally most important domestic policy area in these systems. 
The non-federal systems, in education finance, differ significantly from 
the federal pattern. And with the exception of England, all the non- 
federal systems display a similar pattern of distribution. The impact of 
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* Pearsonian product-moment correlations 
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public policy in these systems is, in distribution terms, to equalize the 
within-nation disparities associated with integration. While the federal 
systems perpetuate the disparities and the inequalities which are the 
inheritance of the historic patterns of social cleavage and wealth, non- 
federal systems tend to  compensate for these disparities. And one also 
finds that, again with the exception of England, the three non-federal 
nations effect a system-wide distribution to the least industrialized 
areas -- the fishing dominant north in Norway, the timber and agrarian 
north of Sweden, and the heavily Protestant north of the Netherlands. 
The comparable patterns of distribution in these three non-federal sys- 
tems - the equalization of integration-related disparities and the redis- 
tribution in favor of the nonindustrial areas - seem to suggest that the 
most conscious criterion of compensation involves differential levels of 
industrialization. This may reflect institutionalization in the party sys- 
tem and the policy arena of advocacy groups - such as primary sector 
based unions and trade associations. 
There is, in the comparability of the patterns of distribution of 
Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands an intriguing phenomenon. Since 
the pattern of distribution in these nations is not socioeconomically 
constrained in the manner common to the federal systems, it is particu- 
larly interesting to  note the similarity in this pattern, and especially the 
nearly identical correlates displayed by the two Scandinavian systems. 
It has often been suggested that nations may emulate their neighbors by 
borrowing policy program  innovation^.^ However, the equally inter- 
esting question of whether nations “borrow” the criteria by which 
public policy effects a redistribution or equalization of regional dis- 
parities has seldom if every been addressed. And yet these data clearly 
imply the presence of similar criteria. 
In the discussion of the three non-federal systems, England has thus 
far been excluded. This nation represents for the non-federal systems 
something of a deviant case just as Canada did for the federal systems in 
the cross-national analysis. When one considers the pattern of distribu- 
tion, and particularly the pattern vis-a-vis the wealth-related integration 
dimension, it seems that England behaves in a sense more as a federal 
than a non-federal system (a finding which we suspect would be even 
more noticeable if the analysis had included Scotland and Wales). While 
central government grants to the Local Education Authorities - the 
administrative counties and county boroughs which together form the 
geographic counties - do manifest the non-federal pattern of giving a 
relative advantage to the least industrialized areas (r =-0.40), it is also 
true that the total allocations tend to be greatest in the most integrated 
areas, i.e., in London, Surrey, East Sussex and Hertfordshire. 
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In one sense, this finding should not be surprising. While England 
lacks a meaningful intermediate policy-making jurisdiction comparable 
to that found in federal systems, there is nevertheless a myriad of 
decision points - including not only boroughs and counties but also 
excepted districts and divisional executives - and the net effect when 
combined with the tradition of strong local government has been to 
fragment decision-making authority in a manner quite distinct from the 
other three non-federal  system^.^ England’s rather unique, semi- 
federal pattern of distribution also reflects the important changes made 
in the 1958 Local Government Act. In this act, the previous system of 
central government grant aid was changed from a percentage equaliza- 
tion to  a general grant system. The new system weighted local need by 
the age and number of children but it did not include, as the former 
system had, an equalization of the variation in local property  value^.^ * 
The system was improved somewhat in the Local Government Act of 
1966 which replaced the general grants by rate support grants. That is, 
the new formula for aid to  the LEAS included a partial equalization of 
the differences in yield which occurred with identical rates. Never- 
theless, because equalization is pegged to  average rather than peak tax 
yields, there is equalization only up to the national average and “above 
average authorities in terms of resources still do exceptionally favor- 
ably.”4 ’ 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the implications suggested by several recent studies in 
comparative public policy analysis, we havc attempted to determine the 
impact of federalism on the equity of distributions of education policy 
outputs. The fundamental hypothesis underlying this analysis has been 
that the structure of intergovernmental relations systematically affects 
the pattern of distribution. Several subsidiary hypotheses were tested in 
order to discover whether this structure, and in particular the distinc- 
tion between federalism and non-federalism, affects public policy. The 
hypothesis was not confirmed in the cross-national analysis where, 
among a set of eighteen nations, the structure of intergovernmental 
relations was only weakly related to proportions of national wealth 
devoted to  education. In the within-nation comparisons, based on four 
federal and four unitary systems, however, the hypothesized distinc- 
tions did appear. The structure of intergovernmental relations does in- 
deed exert a strong contextual effect on the policy process. Unitary 
systems manifest considerably less internal variation and socioeconomic 
247 
constraint on expenditures for education than do the federal systems. 
Most importantly, the non-federal systems compensate for the inherent 
disparities in resource base within the nations. They tend to equalize 
the wealth-rclated disparities associated with a dimension of socio- 
political integration while redistributing resources to  the least indus- 
trialized areas. Federal systems on the other hand tend in their educa- 
tional allocations to  mirror and thus perpetuate the wealth-related in- 
tranational disparities. Traditional, poor, non-integrated areas -- those 
with the greatest concentrations of religious, linguistic, and ethnic par- 
ticularities - are left to  their own devices. They “take advantage” of 
their policy autonomy by providing relatively less fiscal support for 
education than is available to their counterparts in the unitary nations. 
The most important deviations from the systematic relation of struc- 
ture of intergovernmental relations to distribution pattern are the rela- 
tively high proportion of national wealth devoted to education in 
Canada and the relative lack of equalization of wealth-related intrana- 
tional disparities in England. The causes of both deviations can be 
traced to periodically negotiated legislation which shapes existing pat- 
terns of intergovernmental systems of revenue sharing. 
Although we find that the pattern of distribution systematically dif- 
fers in the two types of systems, we have only begun to  suggest why 
this may be so. It seems clear that one possible area of fruitful policy 
research will be an investigation of the criteria for equalization and 
redistribution within nations as well as an examination of the processes 
by which nations borrow and emulate these distributional criteria. 
We can conclude by returning briefly to a consideration of con- 
temporary changes in patterns of intergovernmental relation and, in 
particular, to  the growing attraction of decentralization and quasi- 
federalization. It seems clear that a trade-off may be involved between 
the degree of local and subnational control and regional autonomy on 
one hand and the degree of equity in policy distributions on the other. 
Whatever the appeals of decentralization it secms obvious from the 
analysis presented here that a fundamental change in intergovernmental 
relations toward federalism may in fact exacerbate rather than alleviate 
intranational disparities in socioeconomic resources. 
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Factor Structures for Dimensions of 
Industrialization and Integration: 
Four Non-Federal and Four Federal Nations 
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